RICHARD J. SIMONS, ESO. State Bar No. 72676 KELLY KRAETSCH, ESQ. State Bar No. 281688 **FURTADO, JASPOVICE & SIMONS** A Law Corporation 22274 Main Street Hayward, CA 94541 510/582-1080 Telephones 510/582-8254 Facsimile Rick@fjslaw.com KellvK@fjslaw.com

Plaintiff.

OF NEW YORK, INC., a corporation, et al.,

Defendants.

THE WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY

AUG 0 9 2012

Exec. Off/Clark

8

2

3

4

5

6

7

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA - COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

9

10 JANE DOE.

Attornevs for Plaintiff

JANE DOE

11

12

13

14 15

17

18

19

20

21

· 22

23

24

25

26

16

No. HG11558324

ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO JUDGE ROBERT McGUINESS, DEPARTMENT 22 .

PLAINTIFF'S SURREPLY **MEMORANDUM** POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND J.N.O.V. OF DEFENDANTS WATCHTOWER NEW YORK AND FREMONT CONGREGATION

Date:

August 13, 2012

Time:

8:30 a.m.

Dept:

22

INTRODUCTION

In their Reply, the Church Defendants raise new arguments and authorities not cited in their initial briefing. Specifically, Watchtower makes a number of arguments which cite Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 68. Because plaintiff has been deprived of the opportunity to address the new arguments and new authorities omitted from Watchtower's initial briefing, a Surreply is appropriate.

THE BANKHEAD DECISION DOES NOT CONTROL THE ISSUE OF RATIO IN THIS CASE.

Watchtower argues that Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. is controlling, and that in that case the Appellate Court found that "this Court is required to use the net compensatory damages" in determining the issue of ratio. However, the Bankhead Court did not so hold. On the contrary, the parties in Bankhead Court neither briefed, argued, nor disputed the point. Instead, the Bankhead

parties agreed that the 2.4:1 ratio of punitive damages to the defendant's share of compensatory damages was the measure used, and the Court of Appeal only incorporated that agreement in affirming that ratio. The Court's conclusion that the assignment of a low percentage of liability reduces the amount of compensatory damages with which the punitive damage amount is compared cited no authority and did no analysis. The <u>dicta</u> was not necessary to its decision. (205 Cal.App.4th at 87, and at 90). An Appellate Court decision is not authority for a proposition that it did not consider, and which was not essential to its determination of the issues. (*Richmond v. Shasta Community Services District* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409, 422).

No Due Process case has analyzed this issue and held that due process requires comparison of the plaintiff's harm with only the share of the compensatory damage award attributable to the party assessed punitive damages. Watchtower's conduct was a substantial factor in causing all of plaintiff's harm, regardless of their share of fault. The jury found that none of the plaintiff's harm would have resulted in the absence of Watchtower's conduct. (CACI 430). Therefore, it is plaintiff's harm, and not a reduced share of plaintiff's harm, which is the basis for the ratio of punitive damages.

II. THE BANKHEAD DECISION DOES NOT REQUIRE A MAXIMUM 2.4:1 RATIO.

Watchtower further argues that *Bankhead* requires a maximum ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 2.4:1. (Reply, 8:8-11). This simply misreads *Bankhead*. *Bankhead* specifically notes that the "extreme reprehensibility" of a defendant's conduct, together with other factors in evidence, can justify even a 16:1 ratio of punitive damages. (205 Cal.App.4th at 90, citing *Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, at 560-569).

Watchtower argues that *Bankhead* requires a reduction where the compensatory damages "already includes a punitive element." (Reply, 7:12-16). However, in this case, there is absolutely no basis to conclude that the emotional distress damages included a punitive element. In view of the horrible nature of the abuse plaintiff's suffered, the length of time, and the lifetime effects, plaintiff submitted the figure of \$7 Million as a reasonable amount of compensation. The defendant introduced neither evidence nor argument to contradict this number. The jury was instructed not to

include punitive damages in its verdict. There is no "punitive element" about this compensatory damage award that would bring in the *Bankhead* Court's concern.

III. THE BANKHEAD PUNITIVES ARE ONLY TO PUNISH RATHER THAN DISCOURAGE.

All of the conduct by the defendant in *Bankhead* was past conduct, which it no longer engaged in by the time of trial. The Defendant no longer employed a policy of hiding the risks of asbestos, and no longer failed to protect workers from those risks. Therefore, the recognized purpose of punitive damages to discourage future similar conduct was not applicable in that analysis.

In this case, however, the Court's instruction and plaintiff's counsel's argument focused on discouragement of future harm. Watchtower seeks to shoehorn the punitive nature of the *Bankhead* award into confining the purpose of punitive damages awarded by the jury in this case to punishment only. However, the Supreme Court in *Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191, specifically recognized the proper purposes of punitive damages include protecting citizens against future harm by "deterring a wrongful corporate practice". (35 Cal.4th at 1206 and at 1212). All of the claimed prejudice and error argued by Watchtower because plaintiff's counsel referred to children, when viewed in the context of the right of the state to protect its children, are meritless.

IV. <u>BANKHEAD PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR THE JURY'S AWARD.</u>

The Bankhead opinion provides substantial support for plaintiff's argument that Watchtower's Motions should be denied. The Church Defendants' selective factual citations, which ignore the substantial evidence rule, are similar to the misstatements of the defendant in Bankhead, where the Court stated that the Appellate review was not "an opportunity for [the defendant] to make an end run" around the jury's factual findings. (205 Cal.App.4th at 86).

Bankhead also recognizes that punitive damages are proper, even where there is no evidence that the defendant intended to injure the plaintiff "or anyone else in particular", where that defendant failed to take adequate measures to protect those persons made vulnerable by its conduct. (Id., at 86-88). That failure in Bankhead justified the jury's conclusion that the defendant's conduct constituted malice. The same is true in this case.

///

Dated: August 9, 2012

FURTADO, JASPOVICE & SIMONS A Law Corporation

RICHARD J. SIMONS

Attorneys for Plaintiff

JANE DOE

1 PROOF OF SERVICE (C.C.P. 1013a 2015.5) STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 SS. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 3 I am a citizen of the United States and reside in Alameda County; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 22274 Main Street, Hayward, California 4 94541. 5 On August 9, 2012, I served the within PLAINTIFF'S SURREPLY MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND J.N.O.V. OF DEFENDANTS WATCHTOWER NEW 6 YORK AND FREMONT CONGREGATION on interested parties in said action by the following means: 7 By First Class Mail [X] By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon, fully prepaid, for collection and mailing following the firm's ordinary business practice for deposit in the United States mail in Hayward, California, addressed as shown below: 8 Jonathan Kendrick, In Pro Per 9 200 Honey Lane Oakley, CA 94561 10 925/679-0411 Telephone 11 By Hand-Delivery By causing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope, to be delivered by hand to the address(es) shown below: 12 By Overnight Delivery By causing a true copy thereof, enclosed in a sealed envelope, to be 13 delivered by hand to the address(es) shown below: 14 By Facsimile Transmission - By transmitting a true copy thereof by facsimile transmission from facsimile number (510) 582-8254 to the interested parties to said action at the facsimile number(s) shown 15 below. The facsimile transmission was reported as complete and without error. 16 X By Email By transmitting a true copy thereof to the email address(es) shown below: 17 James M. McCabe, Esq. Robert J. Schnack, Esq. The McCabe Law Firm Jackson Lewis LLP 4817 Santa Monica Avenue 18 801 K Street, Suite 2300 San Diego, CA 92107 Sacramento, CA 95814 619/224-2848 Telephones 916/341-0404 Telephones 19 619/224-0089 Facsimile 916/341-0141 Facsimile jim@mccabelaw.net SchnackR@jacksonlewis.com 20 Attorneys for Defendants egbertd@iacksonlewis.com CHURCH DEFENDANTS Attorney for Defendant 21 WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC. 22 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and 23 correct. 24 Executed on August 9, 2012, at Hayward, California. 25 26 27

PROOF OF SERVICE